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 In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic 
history to analyze the process by which the Chicago 
School of Anti-trust emerged in the 1950s and became 
dominant in the United States. They show that the extent 
to which economic objectives and theoretical views 
shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing 
the minor influence of economics in the promulga-tion of 
U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ cau-
tion toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and 
analyze the process by which the Chicago School 
developed a general and coherent framework for 
competition policy. They rely mainly on 
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the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) 
and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that 
is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the 
authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a 
conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement. 
 Economic analysis has taken the lead in the texts and decisions of 
competition authorities, particularly in the United States, and ref-
erences to “consumer welfare” are well dispersed in decisions and 
guidelines from competition authorities.  1  According to Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, the 1977  GTE Sylvania decision  2  dedicates the 
efforts of the Supreme Court to a conception of the Sherman Act as 
“promot[ing] consumer welfare, not the various sociopolitical aims 
that judges had to read into it.”  3  This represents an administrative 
legal norm and “no doubt lead[s] to more efﬁ cient allocation of 
scarce resources, thereby increasing the wealth of the nation.”  4  This 
market-centered approach is indicative of a process of “economiza-
tion” of antitrust law. Economization can be interpreted in two ways. 
On one hand, the authorities’ decisions are made on an economic 
basis, sometimes involving economists directly. On the other hand, 
it refers to the process launched by the “Second” Chicago School 
of economics that originated with Aaron Director’s work in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, and consisted of grounding antitrust decisions 
in economic efﬁ ciency. 
 Of course, the relationship between antitrust law enforcement 
and economics was forged long before the Second Chicago School. 
Economic theory had been a part of antitrust debates at least since 
the 1930s, with the monopolistic competition model during the 
New Deal  5  and J. M. Clark’s workable competition theory, for 
example.  6  However, the Chicago School did not always advocate 
economic efﬁ ciency as the sole criterion for antitrust authorities. 
The First Chicago School in the 1930s, which included economists 
such as Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, and Henry Simons, supported an 
interventionist antitrust policy to avoid excessive market concentra-
tion. For instance, Simons critiqued New Deal planning experiments 
such as the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) and advocated 
robust antitrust enforcement, including some de-concentration of 
 1.  Orbach, “Was the Crisis in Antitrust a Trojan Horse?”
 2.  Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc ., 433 U.S. 36, 38 (1977).
 3.  Ginsburg, “Originalism and Economic Analysis,” 223.
 4.  Ibid., 231.
 5.  Chamberlin,  The Theory of Monopolistic Competition , 1933.
 6.  Clark, “Toward a Concept of Workable Competition,” 241–256.
U.S. industry: “Here we see champions of free markets promoting 
antitrust and competition as preferable to government regulation, 
planning, or ownership.”  7  
 The rupture produced by the Second Chicago School was not just 
to conclude that economics matters, but also to consider that eco-
nomic efﬁ ciency was the exclusive purpose of antitrust law enforce-
ment. Policy makers did not discover economics with the Chicago 
School; they merely adapted their theoretical framework to include 
the prescription of reliance only on economic factors. The Chicago 
School still predominates antitrust law enforcement. Nicola Giocoli 
states, “Yet, surprisingly enough, Chicago-style ALE [antitrust law 
and economics] … still dominates case-law. Like an old lady, whose 
allure deﬁ es age and physical decay, Chicago’s charm looks almost 
intact among antitrust enforcers.”  8  Among the qualities of this theo-
retical framework, the administrability of its prescriptions is some-
thing with which post-Chicago models—also known as the “New 
Industrial Organization”—from the 1980s cannot compete. These the-
oretical advances, based mostly on game theory models, deliver more 
accurate results, but fail to provide general and unquestioned insights 
because their conclusions are case speciﬁ c and highly dependent on 
the chosen parameters.  9  
 This article addresses the following questions: How and to what 
extent the (Second) Chicago School has become dominant in U.S. 
antitrust law? How did the First Chicago School incorporate distrib-
utive concerns and eventually shift to a version of antitrust that pres-
ents itself as completely apolitical and “neutral”? Economic analysis 
as a scientiﬁ c tool as well as the political and historical context, is 
the key. To contain the scope of analysis, we focus on Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act—that is, monopolization of the market. This refers 
to the capacity of the ﬁ rm to exclude competitors from the market on 
a basis other than merit, which is a more emblematic illustration of 
antitrust policy and also more difﬁ cult for scholars and practitioners 
to characterize. The case of the controversial and quickly withdrawn 
report by the Department of Justice related to single-ﬁ rm conduct in 
2008 testiﬁ es to this vigorous debate.  10  This polarization contrasts 
 7.  Kovacic and Shapiro, “Antitrust Policy,” 49.
 8.  Giocoli, “Old Lady Charm.”
 9.  See, e.g., the classic book  The Theory of Industrial Organization , by the 2014 
Nobel economics laureate Jean Tirole. 
 10.  The report came to a climax in its very cautious (and therefore Chicagoan)
approach to potential abuses by monopoly ﬁ rms. In other words, the report advo-
cated for the development of safe harbors for certain unilateral practices. The 
report was released after a series of joint hearings, involving more than 100 partic-
ipants, including the most inﬂ uent Chicago scholars. “Many panelists supported a 
market-share safe harbor in section 2 cases” (p. 24). 
with cases of mergers and coordinated practices issues. Contrary 
to the 1960s and 1970s, the debate on the risks of overenforcement 
of antitrust law provision related to mergers is less accurate. In the 
same way, public enforcement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act has 
always been in place, whatever the political shift.  11  This contrasting 
treatment may be explained by the shared view that collusive agree-
ments among competitors are inexorably harmful to the consumer. 
However, the dynamics of Section 2 may be generalized to other 
areas of regulatory policy. The cases of deregulation in network 
industries are other striking examples of such dynamics. 
 We limit our analysis to an endpoint in the early 1980s for both 
historical (the reversal of the U.S. Supreme Court relative to monop-
olization cases and the appointment of William Baxter as the head 
of Antitrust Division by President Reagan), and theoretical reasons 
(the rising inﬂ uence from the 1980s onward of post-Chicago mod-
els, making Chicagoan clear-cut results more contestable). Thus, 
we do not address the Post-Chicago School’s reliance (from the 
early 1980s) on ﬁ rm strategy and game theory. We analyze the par-
adigm shift in U.S. antitrust enforcement but do not deal with the 
issue of whether the U.S. Supreme Court perfectly embraces the 
Chicago message or develops a synthesis between Harvard and 
Chicago prescriptions.  12 
 As discussed later, the Chicago School has led to the economiza-
tion of antitrust law. From a social perspective, the Chicago choice 
to frame efﬁ ciency as the exclusive goal of antitrust may have had 
some unexpected implications in terms of distributional aspects of 
wealth creation. Nonetheless, nowadays, despite critics of the under-
lying oversimpliﬁ cation of economic models used in antitrust litiga-
tion, the Chicagoan inﬂ uence lies in its capacity to provide clear-cut 
conclusions about what is efﬁ cient and what is inefﬁ cient. Actually, 
the Chicago School in its origins bitterly criticized per se rules 
(an  ex ante description of what is banned or allowed related to market 
strategies), which ultimately led to the 1977  GTE Sylvania decision 
that overturned a longstanding per se rule against vertical restraints 
and allowed for a  rule of reason (an ex-post overall evaluation of 
the different consequences). We argue that the  tour de force was the 
 11.  See, e.g., Levenstein, “Escape from Equilibrium,” 710–728.
 12.  The complexity of the economic literature and the diversity of the results
of alternative models make it very difﬁ cult to trace a clear-cut inﬂ uence of a given 
economic theory on legal ruling. Therefore, the actual and current effective inﬂ u-
ence of the Chicago School on U.S. Supreme Court case law is difﬁ cult to deﬁ ne. 
The economic literature provides different views about the dominant paradigm 
(Chicago, Harvard or both) (Kovacic, 2007), or contests the possibilities for and 
even the necessity of characterizing such a paradigm (Kobayashi and Muris, 2013). 
School’s success in simplifying its recommendations and, therefore, 
its reliance on per se rules, in terms not of unlawfulness but of law-
fulness. In the end, the promotions of these new per se rules may be 
explained by the Chicagoan scholars’ fear of ungrounded decisions. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁ rst section outlines the 
absence of economic analysis in the foundations of U.S. antitrust leg-
islation, given the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. The second 
section highlights U.S. economists’ very cautious antitrust views until 
the Second New Deal. The third section analyzes the process by which 
the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for 
antitrust, and passed from theory to practice. The ﬁ nal section dis-
cusses the implications of Chicago School thinking, particularly the 
unexpected and spectacular tendency to advocate for per se rules, and 
then broadens the discussion on the long-run impact on economic and 
social inequalities of this polarization of economic efﬁ ciency. 
 The (Almost) Noneconomic Sherman Act (1890–1936) 
 In this section, we demonstrate that the origins of the economization 
of antitrust, as deﬁ ned earlier, are not rooted in the 1890 Sherman 
Act. This act is considered to be the ﬁ rst U.S. antitrust law.  13  Section 1 
prohibits agreements about “restraints of trade” and Section 2 outlaws 
monopolization—that is, exclusion of competition. 
 What has come to be known as the ﬁ rst pillar of antitrust initially 
included very few elements related to economic analysis. What at ﬁ rst 
sight might seem surprising might be partly explained by the state of 
U.S. economic thinking in the 1890s.  14  Before we analyze the details 
of how the Sherman Act was created, it is important to note that eco-
nomic analysis was in its infancy when Congress was debating it. A few 
years later, in 1897, Irving Fisher published the translation of Cournot’s 
famous 1838 book on mathematical approaches to economic activity.  15 
Only from that time forward was an analytical link between market 
shares and market power feasible. In 1890, the tools were not available.  16 
 13.  In the online appendix, we provide a timeline describing historical fact,
legislative acts, and legal and economic schools of thought. 
 14.  Orbach, “How Antitrust Lost Its Goal,” 2253–2277.
 15.  Cournot, Fisher.  Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory
of Wealth . 
 16.  Barak Orbach summarizes the general economic knowledge by adding
that “when Congress debated the Sherman Act, economists sharply distin-
guished between trusts (monopoly) and competition. Some prominent econo-
mists, like John Bates Clark, defended the trusts and monopolies, expressing 
conﬁ dence in the effectiveness of potential competition and other theories. Over-
all, it is fair to state that, when Congress considered the Sherman Act, American 
Indeed, “leading economists of the day had very little inﬂ uence on the 
passage of the Act.”  17  
 Although Judge Robert Bork  18  —one of the U.S.’s most inﬂ uential 
legal scholars  19  — identiﬁ ed the defense of consumer welfare (“con-
sumer welfare hypothesis”), there is also a large body of literature 
that pleads for the defense of small businesses against trusts (the 
“small-business hypothesis”). As Anne Mayhew argues, there is no 
doubt that output rose and prices fell with the development of the 
Standard Oil Trust during the 1870s and 1880s. Protest against Stan-
dard Oil originated not with consumers, but with less-efﬁ cient com-
petitors. Finally, Robert Lande gives three reasons for the passing of 
the Sherman Act: preventing monopolistic transfers of wealth from 
consumers to trusts, enhancing productive efﬁ ciency to allow con-
sumers also to beneﬁ t, and reducing the social and political power 
of large aggregations of capital and providing opportunities for small 
entrepreneurs.  20  
 The Complex History of the Sherman Act 
 The enactment of the Sherman Act has a very complex history, 
which is not traceable to any clear purpose other than the feeling 
at the time that “something ought to be done about the trusts.”  21 
economists mostly held an intuitive understanding that monopolies lead to 
high prices, while competition in the form of a marketplace with many sellers 
drives prices down. With such intuitions, the protection of small businesses 
may seem to serve competition. Small businesses allegedly contributed to com-
petition, as it was understood at the time” (Orbach, “How Antitrust Lost Its 
Goal,” 2263). 
 17.  Lande, “Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust,” 88. In his 1982 Richard T. Ely Lecture, Stigler added a touch of humor in 
saying, “A careful student of the history of economics would have searched long 
and hard, on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President 
Harrison, for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of actively 
combatting collusion or monopolization in the economy at large” (Stigler, “The 
Economists and the Problem of Monopoly,” 3). 
 18.  Bork, “Legislative Intent,” 7.
 19.  Indeed, Robert Bork is fully representative of the Second Chicago School
of antitrust. First, he was one of the ﬁ rst most productive young scholars associ-
ated with Director and Levi’s research program. In 1954, he published a striking 
case-based article criticizing the treatment of vertical integration under the Sherman 
Act (Bork, “Vertical Integration”). Second, according to Posner, his 1978 book 
 Antitrust Paradox embodies “the most complete and most orthodox statement of 
the Chicago position” (Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” 926). 
 20.  Ibid.
 21.  Dewey, “Antitrust: Science or Religion,” 414. The antitrust critique of big
business ﬂ ourished in the U.S. during the 1880s. See John, “Robber Barons Redux: 
Antimonopoly Reconsidered,” for placing the robber baron in his cultural and 
institutional context. 
The Sherman Act’s difﬁ cult legislative “delivery”  22  explains the 
absence of any clear-cut deﬁ nition of its legislative intent, which 
left the door open to controversies over its core meaning.  23  In addi-
tion, its enforcement by the federal courts favored signiﬁ cant rever-
sals in its interpretation, and encouraged implementation of bypass 
strategies such as the Clayton and the FTC Acts of 1914, and their 
later amendments. 
 The crucial point is interpretation of the Sherman Act’s legisla-
tive intent, which has been debated by legal and economic schol-
ars, as well as historians, ever since.  24  In a striking 1966 article, 
Judge Robert Bork admitted “that many of the legislators who voted 
for the Sherman Act may have had values in mind in addition to or 
other than consumer welfare.”  25  However, he added that “not only 
was the consumer welfare the predominant goal expressed in Con-
gress but the evidence strongly indicates that, in case of conﬂ ict, 
other values were to give way before it.”  26  Consequently, consumer 
welfare considerations must impose themselves in judicial deci-
sion.  27  Judge Bork also wrote, “For a judge to give weight to other 
values, therefore, can never assist in the correct disposition of a 
case and may lead to error. In short, since the legislative history 
of the Sherman Act shows consumer welfare to be the decisive 
value, it should be treated by a court as the only value.”  28  As Bork 
acknowledged, the problem is that the interpretation of the under-
lying, fundamental value of the U.S. antitrust laws varied throughout 
more than a century.  29  Judge Learned Hand’s views in  Alcoa or 
 Associated Press  30  in 1945 were obviously not based on the con-
sumer welfare criterion. Judge Hand wrote in the  Alcoa decision 
that the Sherman Act aims to preserve a situation of effective com-
petition with no regard for cost considerations. Thus, antitrust 
 22.  See among others, Kolasky, “Senator John Sherman,” 85–89.
 23.  Stigler, “The Sherman Act,” 1–12.
 24.  We do not discuss the extent to which the Sherman Act addressed con-
temporary economic problems. Some scholars consider that its promulgation can-
not be explained by consumer welfare protection since the targeted trusts were 
expanding output and reducing prices in their market at more than the average 
level recorded in U.S. industry at that time (DiLorenzo and High, “Antitrust and 
Competition,” 423–435). 
 25.  Bork, “Legislative Intent,” 10.
 26.  Ibid.
 27.  In  The Antitrust Paradox , Bork again insisted on this point: “conventional
indicia of legislative intent overwhelmingly support the conclusions that the anti-
trust laws should be interpreted as designed for the sole purpose of forwarding 
consumer welfare” (Bork,  Antitrust Paradox , 71). 
 28.  Bork, “Legislative Intent,” 11.
 29.  Kovacic and Shapiro, “Antitrust Policy,” 43–60.
 30.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of America , 148 F.2d 416, 428, (2nd Cir.
1945);  Associated Press v. United States , 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
laws are interpreted as a tool that judges may use to prevent or to 
correct excessive concentrations of market power.  31 
 The history of the enactment of the Sherman Act explains these 
conﬂ icting interpretations and its remarkable plasticity. First, 
Sherman’s proposal was closely linked to the late 1880s debates 
between Republicans and Democrats.  32  The Republicans advo-
cated a protective tariff policy to defend domestic industries. At 
the same time, price increases might be also explained by the con-
solidation of U.S. industry. The Republicans feared that the Demo-
crats would beneﬁ t from the public antipathy toward trusts. They 
saw the challenge as avoiding excessive government interventions 
against ﬁ rms and lowering tariff barriers. The legislative story of 
the act is complex. Sherman’s wording was vague (promoting free 
and full competition to guarantee increased production and lower 
prices) and it was entirely rewritten by the Judiciary Committee of 
the Senate, which pushed Sherman outside the legislative process. 
One result was that Sherman was sharply critical of the law that bore 
his name.  33  
 Second, the speciﬁ city of the enactment of the Sherman Act 
might explain its very speciﬁ c enforcement regime in terms of the 
role given to the courts. Debate on the competence of Congress to 
regulate commerce was particularly heated. According to William 
Kolasky, to defuse the conﬂ ict, Sherman argued that antitrust laws 
did not constitute real novelty and could be integrated within the 
principles of U.S. common law.  34  Therefore, enforcement should be 
the responsibility of the federal courts. This tactical choice raised 
two major difﬁ culties. The ﬁ rst relates to the issue of delegating to 
federal courts choice among conﬂ icting values; the second relates 
to the room given to late–nineteenth-century Conservative courts to 
thwart this legislative activism. 
 31.  “We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monop-
oly: but … there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial consol-
idations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the 
debates in Congress, Senator Sherman himself… showed that among of the pur-
poses of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of cap-
ital because of the helplessness of the individual before them. … Throughout the 
history of these statutes (the antitrust laws including the Sherman Act), it has been 
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, 
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small 
units which can effectively compete with each other”.  United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America , ibid. See Winerman and Kovacic, “Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the 
Reluctant Application of the Sherman Act.” 
 32.  Kolasky, “Senator John Sherman,” 85–89.
 33.  Thorelli,  The Federal Antitrust Policy .
 34.  Kolasky, “Senator John Sherman,” 85–89.
 The Vague and Noneconomic Foundations 
 The legislation provided very vague provisions and gave no guid-
ance to judicial authorities responsible for its enforcement. The cen-
tral terms, including “competition,” “unfair methods of competition,” 
“conspiracy in restraint of trade,” and “monopolize,” are not self-
deﬁ ning. Consequently, the core meaning of the provisions of the 
Sherman Act were determined in practice. In other words, the desig-
nated task was to elaborate a “working deﬁ nition of competition.”  35 
The close connection between decisional practice and theory can be 
seen as a consequence of this inner nature of U.S. antitrust. Although 
there is a political cycle,  36  particularly for public enforcement, the ﬁ rst 
years of the twentieth century demonstrate that there is also a longer 
cycle explained by the percolation of an economic idea throughout the 
legal system. A dominant economic conception of the meaning of com-
petition played irreversibly on judges’ conceptions, as Justice Oliver 
W. Holmes described in  The Common Law (1881). 
 However, U.S. antitrust history demonstrates that theoretical 
economic debate was not the driving force of antitrust evolution; 
its inﬂ uence was present from the 1970s, but there is a signiﬁ cant 
gap between academic controversies and the reversal of case law. 
Although this delay might be explained by the speciﬁ cities of anti-
trust enforcement (such as the composition of the U.S. Supreme 
Court),  37  it might also be indicative of a not-so-dominant position 
of economics in the shaping of competition policy. For example, 
Senator Sherman’s letters conﬁ rm that consumers were not among 
his priorities in formulating antitrust law.  38  Small oil businesses 
sent numerous letters to Senator Sherman asking him to take action 
against Standard Oil, complaining about the rebates Standard Oil 
received from the railroads. The corporation was able to take advan-
tage of these rebates only because it shipped its oil in tank cars 
rather than in barrels. Small competitors asked the senator to intro-
duce legislative regulations prohibiting tank car rebates. Sherman even-
tually did so, but was never able to secure their passage. Analyzing 
Sherman’s letters in historical context, Werner Troesken argues 
that “although small oil reﬁ ners were disappointed when Sherman 
failed to deliver an anti-tank car law, they were apparently quite sat-
isﬁ ed when he secured passage of Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.”  39  
 35.  Bork,  Antitrust Paradox .
 36.  Baker, “Political Bargain,” 483–530.
 37.  Critics of the U.S. Supreme Court’s “conservatism” (see Breyer, “Economic
Reasoning,” F123–F135). 
 38.  Troesken, “The Letters of John Sherman,” 275–295.
 39.  Ibid., 282.
This adds to the evidence that the Sherman Antitrust Act was prob-
ably never intended to increase social welfare.  40  
 Another example of the lack of economic analysis is also sup-
ported by Sherman’s correspondence. Even though he reasoned with 
small oil producers that were using less-advanced technology (barrels 
vs. tank cars), Sherman made no effort to help businesses that were 
harmed by vertical restraints. His antitrust proposals did not address 
such restraints in any way. His stance was in sharp contrast to the 
positions of other state and federal legislators who claimed that ver-
tical restraints could have expressly anticompetitive effects.  41  Anne 
Mayhew notes insightfully, “Neither the economists nor the lawyers 
of the day lobbied for the Sherman Act as a way of preventing monop-
olistic pricing.”  42  
 Economics and Antitrust Law Enforcement: A Late 
Marriage 
 Following this demonstration in the preceding section that econom-
ics did not initially shape antitrust laws, we now seek to show that 
economic matters were not always seen as crucial in antitrust law 
enforcement. U.S. economists had long been circumspect toward 
antitrust law. Interestingly, although economic theory had recently 
converged with the everyday reality of antitrust law enforcement, 
the dominant conception of the core purpose of the Antitrust Act 
evolved over time. Leading U.S. economists were cautious about 
antitrust legislation, seeing it as echoing classical theoretical 
economics models that appeared distant from the U.S. economic 
dynamics, yet they considered these laws relevant tools for sanc-
tioning undue wealth transfers at the expense of consumers and 
market actors deprived of economic power, and for ensuring a 
desirable level of dispersion of economic power, to preserve both 
economic and political liberties. 
 We ﬁ rst analyze the initial distrust of antitrust among U.S. schol-
ars, from its enactment to the ﬁ rst New Deal with the NIRA, and 
then examine the reversal induced by the renewal of antitrust law 
enforcement during the second New Deal. Finally, we highlight that 
such an evolution—broadly independent of any theoretical dispute—
converged to a consensus among U.S. economists on the appropri-
ate role of antitrust law. 
 40.  DiLorenzo, “The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective,” 74.
 41.  Troesken, “The Letters of John Sherman,” 287.
 42.  Mayhew, “The Sherman Act as Protective Reaction.” 390.
 A Long Mutual Ignorance 
 The choice of judicial enforcement was a means to limit government 
interference in the economy. Such an institutional device needs to be 
analyzed in light of U.S. debates between the 1880s and the 1930s, 
opposing legal realists and institutional economists  43  and laissez-faire 
promoters. The legal realists we would describe as progressives consid-
ered that the state had a role to play in controlling market transactions 
and promoting an economic welfare oriented view of the common 
good.  44  The main opposition to this interventionist program came from 
the judicial arena, as Justice Holmes (1897) stated in his seminal article, 
“The Path of the Law.” The treatise by Christopher Tiedeman laid the 
foundations for the principle according to which a legislative majority 
must be constrained in its decisions by the individual rights protected 
by the U.S. Constitution.  45  The “Due Process of Law” clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment are interpreted as severe limitations on gov-
ernment’s policy power. From this constitutionally based conception 
of limited government power stemmed numerous court decisions that 
limited the scope of state intervention to defend the principles of free-
dom of contracts and protection of private property.  46 
 The opinions of the legal realists and the institutional economists 
were polarized in their criticism of the Court’s conservatism, which 
was rationalized by the doctrine of  classical legal thought . This doc-
trine justiﬁ es constraining the legislature’s decisions through the 
 43.  Institutional economists—whose ﬁ gureheads were John Rogers Commons
and Thorstein Veblen—focus directly on the role of institutions (e.g., the ﬁ rm, 
the state, the market) in shaping economic behavior. For further details on insti-
tutional economics, see Dewey and Rutherford, “Institutionalism, old,” 374–381. 
 44.  Fried,  The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire . See also Kitch, “The Fire
of Truth,” on the inﬂ uence, in the 1930s, of legal realism in shaping law depart-
ments to an economic approach. “It is clear that legal realism made people in law 
schools open to the social sciences. ... In the years that followed, American law 
schools were to try them all. That environment was receptive to the introduction 
of economics into a law school” (ibid., p. 165). This is part of a great discussion 
that took place in a 1981 conference in Los Angeles that gathered the most famous 
tenants of the Chicago School, such as Bork, Director, Friedman, Posner, and Sti-
gler, among others. 
 45.  Tiedeman,  A Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power .
 46.  The main stumbling blocks were undoubtedly the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution according to which “no person shall be … deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law” and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
promulgated just after the Civil War, that prohibited State laws whose effects might 
lead to depriving citizens of these rights. With its 1872 Slaughter-House Cases, 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a very extensive view of this clause. The term 
“person” was thereafter interpreted very broadly to encompass ﬁ rms, and liberty 
was assimilated to the notion of freedom of contract. Each ﬁ rm is free to decide 
to contract or not to contract, and to set the contractual terms, e.g. prices, without 
restriction. 
logical functioning of the common law and the principles of the 
U.S. Constitution. In contrast, realists, such as Justice Holmes, in 
his dissent in  Lochner ,  47  considered that “general propositions do 
not decide concrete cases.” In other words, rulings must also be 
based on an assessment of their economic and social implications 
and on the “felt necessities of the time.”  48  Despite these determined 
contestations, the Supreme Court defeated state interventionism 
toward market practices (both limiting anticompetitive practices 
and regulating tariffs or contractual conditions). From the 1905 
 Lochner decision to the 1937  West Coast Hotel Co v. Parrish  49  decision, 
the two pillars of constitutional laissez-faire—freedom to contract 
and the protection of private property—thwarted regulation poli-
cies and antitrust enforcement. 
 U.S. economists’ mistrust of antitrust enforcement did not falter 
until the Second New Deal in 1936.  50  In this, economists were not 
alone. Legal scholars and politicians were equally dissatisﬁ ed about 
the Sherman Act’s institutional framework, and the conditions of its 
enforcement by the courts, as demonstrated by the Clayton Act and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (both 1914). However, if their critiques 
of court rulings were based on the lack of consideration of their eco-
nomic impact because of the prevalent legal dogmatism of the judges, 
this is not to say that these criticisms were founded on the argument of 
consumer welfare maximization. Indeed, the main theoretical concept 
of the institutional economists was the transaction. Analyzing trans-
actions assumes consideration of the distribution of property rights. 
Transactions create both vertical relationships among individuals and 
the goods they own, and horizontal relationships among people through 
contracts. These relationships produce signiﬁ cant coercive power among 
those contracting. The parties can no longer be considered purely inde-
pendent. In addition, they cannot beneﬁ t from equivalent negotiating 
powers, as property rights are not equally distributed among people. 
Consequently, in some transactions, only one of the counterparts can 
beneﬁ t from the capacity to refuse to contract or to withdraw from the 
transaction. Demonstrating the existence of market power is possible, 
 47.  Lochner v. New York , 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
 48.  “Life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed 
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have 
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men 
should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through 
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and 
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what 
it has been, and what it tends to become” (Holmes,  The Common Law ). 
 49.  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish , 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
 50.  Stigler,  The Economist as Preacher .
which implies a coercive effect on the second party to the transaction, 
whose freedom of choice is constrained. Antitrust intervention is 
grounded not in old institutional economists’ views of con sumer wel-
fare maximization but on the notion of freedom of choice.  51  
 As Barbara Fried notes, if a ﬁ rm had a de facto monopoly on nec-
essary goods, it could refuse to sell the goods or could threaten not to 
sell them except on payment of an extortionate amount.  52  This implies 
both exclusionary and exploitation abuses that are not grounded in 
consumer welfare maximization but in coercive power, such as 
market power. Institutional economists consider that such behaviors 
threaten competition, in the same way as government intervention 
might. In their views, courts do not have to protect such powers on 
the basis of constitutional principles, and at the same time censure 
government interventions that aim to correct their effects. Coercive 
powers affect transactions among individuals, and, consequently, 
other constitutional rights. For institutional economists, the proper 
arbiter is the legislature, not the courts. Government intervention—as 
the Freiburg School promoted after World War II—is grounded in a 
positive theory of freedom through law (accessing the market, bene-
ﬁ t from fair price conditions). Put differently, U.S. economists con-
sidered antitrust law enforcement as one of the tools, together with 
legislation and public utilities regulation, for the necessary “social 
control” of economic activities. These scholars believed that contem-
porary economic problems could be managed through “intelligent 
handling” in legislation.  53  Nevertheless, antitrust was viewed with 
considerable as long as its enforcement was the responsibility of the 
courts. The Supreme Court’s legal interpretation of the scope of gov-
ernment intervention (as in price regulation) was so restrictive that 
institutional economists were doubtful about the possibility to con-
trol the exercise of coercive power through the Sherman Act. 
 The progressive era debate that led to the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) Act in 1914 exempliﬁ es the wide mistrust of antitrust. The FTC 
Act’s statutes allow avoidance of judicial enforcement of its decisions, 
unlike Sherman Act-based cases, which are enforced by the courts.  54 
Thus, U.S. scholars and decision makers were all the more reluctant 
vis-à-vis the Sherman Act’s judicial enforcement for public debate to 
be “monopolized” by the concept of “new competition.” The latter 
advocated for inter-ﬁ rm cooperation through information exchange 
 51.  Giocoli, “Competition vs. Property Rights,” 747–786.
 52.  Fried,  The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire .
 53.  Hamilton, “The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory,” 312.
 54.  Kovacic and Winerman, “Competition Policy and the Application of Sec-
tion 5,” 929–950. 
regarding prices and output decisions to stabilize the market process. 
For example, the American Fair Trade League, personiﬁ ed by the 
future Justice Brandeis,  55  ran a campaign in favor of coordination of 
companies aimed at fostering market stability and eliminating “cut-
throat competition.”  56  From these perspectives, the best system was 
regulated competition, following the example of the War Industries 
Board established in July 1917. Such a technocratic view of “managed 
competition” was nothing other than a negation of antitrust principles, 
especially in their future Chicagoan orientation. This view received its 
greatest recognition with the First New Deal within NIRA promulgated 
by the Roosevelt administration. The NIRA sought to protect—and even 
to promote—coordination of practices and was initially well accepted 
by scholars, because they considered that such an organization favored 
the monitoring of business practices in the public interest.  57  Antitrust 
prosecution was almost entirely suspended until the reversal imparted 
by the Second New Deal.  58 
 The Second New Deal and the Rediscovering of the Sherman Act 
 During the First New Deal, antitrust laws seemed to be permanently 
marginalized. However, President Roosevelt’s stance on economic 
policy was quite complex. His views on the relationships with big 
business were balanced by completely opposing tendencies, such 
as Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism and the Woodrow Wilson’s 
New Liberty. New Nationalism favored signiﬁ cant regulatory powers 
for the federal government to counterbalance corporate power, whereas 
 55.  Louis D. Brandeis’ support for the American Fair Trade League echoes with 
his advocacy for a “regulated competition” (see Berk,  Brandeis and the Mak-
ing of Regulated Competition ). Berk demonstrates that Brandeis paved a third 
way between populist Democrats, according to whom the concentration of eco-
nomic private powers endangered democracy, and Progressives, considering that 
large-scale corporations result from economic efﬁ ciency and must therefore be 
regulated. However, Brandeis argues that conventional tools of regulation are 
ineffective to address this issue; a third way of a “regulated competition” should 
be experimented with. The early FTC embodied such an approach, combining 
coercive interventions against predatory methods of competition and a “culti-
vational governance,” consisting of the dissemination of best practices among 
ﬁ rms and in the implementation of benchmarking tools (see also Childs, “Gerald 
Berk. Louis D. Brandeis,” 840). Brandeis refers to a Republican alternative pro-
duced by a “syncretic” view between a progressive faith in scientiﬁ c expertise 
and a populist afﬁ nity with market discipline. According to Berk, the spirit of 
the cultivational regulation survived to Supreme Court’s rulings and inﬂ uenced 
the NIRA experience. 
 56.  Tadajewski, “Competition, Cooperation and Open Price Associations,”
122–143. See also Childs, “Gerald Berk. Louis D. Brandeis,” 839. 
 57.  Rutherford, “Walton Hamilton,” 1385–1407.
 58.  Gressley, “Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal,” 214–231.
New Liberty sought to strengthen antitrust laws to preserve economic 
liberty despite the concentration of private economic powers.  59 
 The failure of the NIRA constituted a breaking point for U.S. econ-
omists’ views of antitrust laws. Renewed public enforcement, with 
the appointment in 1938 of Thurman Arnold as head of the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice, represented a new start, 
favored by a “progressive” shift within the Supreme Court.  60  Revived 
enforcement by the Roosevelt administration contrasted sharply 
with the NIRA, which the Supreme Court rejected. The First New 
Deal supported a quasi-suspension of antitrust laws to promote close 
cooperation among ﬁ rms, labor unions, and government. The aim 
was to frustrate what appeared to be self-destructive competition that 
pushed down prices and deterred investment decisions and employ-
ment, ignoring what then appeared to be outdated liberal policies. 
It might be considered paradoxical that the impossibility of pursu-
ing cooperation between government and ﬁ rms and promoting close 
coordination among competitors had led the Roosevelt administra-
tion to revive inverse conditions. 
 Several factors might explain this reversal. First, the New Dealers 
were not a homogeneous group. As Hawley and Freyer underline,  61  
some were still advocating for a reconstruction of the New Deal poli-
cies for cooperative planning, whereas others, such as Robert Jackson, 
who in January 1937 was appointed the assistant attorney general for 
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, proposed to renew it 
through an active antimonopoly campaign. Jackson’s success in con-
vincing President Roosevelt might be explained by the then current 
macro-economic situation and by the president’s views on economic 
matters. According to Freyer, Franklin Delano Roosevelt “generally 
 59.  See also Nachbar (2013) for an analysis of antitrust laws as a tool for depriv-
ing private economic powers of regulation power. Accordingly, the logic of per se 
rules in vertical restriction matters is not related exclusively to allocative efﬁ ciency 
concerns (“market harm”), but it also affects “regulatory harm.” This latter corre-
sponds to the restriction imposed by private economic powers in terms of freedom 
of choice and contractual liberties. In a nutshell, a monopolist’s property rights 
might be considered regulation of the use of the product concerned (Brandeis, 1934). 
 Because these two dimensions cannot be balanced, the rule of reason should 
not be applied. To sum up, the logic of the 1977  GTE Sylvania decision, according 
to which the net effect of a vertical restriction on efﬁ ciency has to determine the 
ruling, is the exact opposite of the New Deal era decisions in  Fashion Originators 
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), in which the restrictions imposed by 
guild members on distributors in order to avoid model copying, were condemned 
per se although they might be welfare enhancing. 
 60.  Judge Bork emphasized that, for forty years, the U.S. Supreme Court coun-
teracted the tendencies of the Congress to use antitrust laws as a lever for social 
reforms (Bork, “Legislative Intent,” 7–48). 
 61.  Hawley, New Deal, 12–13; Freyer, Antitrust, 10.
conceived of economic issues in terms of rights and wrongs.”  62  In the 
case at hand, the failure of his initial policy and the economic context 
characterized by rising prices and concomitant stagnation of wages 
and employment may be imputed to lack of support from big busi-
ness. In sum, the wage-price imbalance was seen simultaneously as 
a major obstacle to the recovery, and as fostering political support for 
more activist antitrust enforcement. Again, ﬁ fty years after the Sherman 
Act’s passage, the social consensus was that something must be done 
about the trusts. However, antitrust laws were challenged for seem-
ing to be based on a perfect competition theory framework that took 
no account of either the economic realities of large ﬁ rms enjoying 
economics of scale and scope, or the theoretical advances in under-
standing imperfect competition. Competition could no longer be 
considered effective rivalry among small units. At the same time, it 
seemed necessary not to ward off the effects of the concentration of 
economic power in light of the contemporary situation in Germany. 
 Assistant Attorney General Jackson patiently worked to pave the 
way for President Roosevelt’s 1938 antitrust speech by advocating 
that big business should be accountable and by reorganizing the Anti-
trust Division, putting the emphasis on economic advisors’ support to 
handle the increasing demand for economic data. The antimonopoly 
study committee created in October 1937 was another step toward a 
political inﬂ ection, preceding the president’s 1938 message to Con-
gress, in which he announced that the Department of Justice should 
collate material on monopoly abuses and possible remedies. 
 The pro-antitrust tendency progressively prevailed over the pro-
moters of a new NIRA policy. The renewal of a kind of cooperative 
approach with big business was no longer on the agenda, as the 
recession was blamed on “the lack of purchasing power of the lowest 
income classes”  63  —a result, to some New Dealers, of a “capital strike” 
against the government. Again, antitrust laws were not conceived 
as a tool to promote economic efﬁ ciency (as market concentration 
was considered to produce welfare gains), but rather as a means to 
sanction undue transfers of wealth among economic agents.  64  Such 
transfers not only raised distributional concerns within society, but 
also imperiled its growth potential by depressing effective demand. 
In addition, the question of the rise of private economic powers, and 
the risks this induced for the democratic system, were crucial to 
 62.  Freyer, Antitrust, 10.
 63.  Freyer, Antitrust, 18.
 64.  This concern is seen as the same concern that led to enactment of the
Sherman Act, as Robert Lande underlines, “if Congress primarily had cared 
about enhancing economic efﬁ ciency, it would have enacted ’protrust‘ laws, not 
‘antitrust’ laws” (Lande, “A Traditional and Textualist Analysis,” 2360). 
President Roosevelt’s view. Although efﬁ ciency constraints demand 
concentration, they might well impair the consumer welfare of indi-
viduals and small ﬁ rms’ economic opportunities. In this respect, 
Robert Lande’s views about the purpose of antitrust laws provide a 
more fruitful analytical lens to explain the Second New Deal’s politi-
cal shift than Bork’s more polarized view of efﬁ ciency.  65  
 The appointment of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust 
Division might be seen as controversial, considering his initial views 
on the Sherman Act. Earlier, as a Harvard law professor, Arnold had 
been inﬂ uenced by the legal realists, and consequently was doubt-
ful about the classical theoretical framework that apparently shaped 
the Sherman Act, and about its judicial enforcement, considering the 
Supreme Court’s long-standing conservatism. If Arnold initially saw 
monopolies as necessary public evils, the Great Depression led him 
to tackle the issue of private economic power. The coercive power of 
monopolies in economic transactions allowed them to exclude com-
petitors from the market and to extract excessive rents at the expense 
of consumers and economic partners. 
 A convergence between the economic and legal ﬁ elds, embodied in 
Mason’s articles on adapting economic analysis of antitrust to imper-
fect competition theories and providing suitable economic tests with 
increasing budgetary resources, supported the Antitrust Division’s 
actions.  66  Some simple data allow a quick overview of the strength 
of the political impulse. Freyer shows that in 1937–38, the Anti-
trust Division had instituted only eleven cases and ﬁ fty-nine “major” 
investigations, but by 1939–40 it had commenced ninety-two cases 
and 215 investigations and, in that same ﬁ scal year, won thirty-
one of its thirty-three concluded cases.  67  The  Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 
Supreme Court decision  68  constitutes a landmark that is fully 
 65.  We could discuss the place of efﬁ ciency-related concerns in these two
approaches (see, e.g., Lande, 2013; 2354). First, the wealth–transfer-centered 
approach cannot be seen as neutral in terms of its allocative efﬁ ciency. Indeed, any 
welfare transfer among economic actors has efﬁ ciency consequences since produc-
tion, investment, and consumption choices are altered vis-à-vis a perfect compe-
tition setting. Second, the consumer welfare criterion is insufﬁ ciently discussed, 
as there is no reason why a producer enjoying a monopoly position will pass on 
gains to the ﬁ nal consumer. In other words, the balance between anticompetitive 
and efﬁ ciency enhancing effects is based on a purely hypothetical compensation 
scheme. As Lande (2013; 2360) claims, “the [Bork’s] deceptive use of the term 
‘consumer welfare,’ instead of the more honest term ‘total welfare,’ was a brilliant 
way to market the efﬁ ciency objective.” 
 66.  These rose from $200,000 before 1937, to $440,000 for the ﬁ scal year 1937–38,
$780,000 for 1938–39, reaching $1,325,000 in 1939–40 and 1940–41 (see Freyer, 
2006, p. 28). 
 67.  Freyer, Antitrust, 27.
 68.  U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co ., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
representative of this policy shift. The decision of this ﬁ rm to pur-
chase the surplus produced by independent reﬁ ners made sense 
according to the values promoted by the NIRA. Such behavior led to 
stable prices and allowed the ﬁ rm to recoup its ﬁ xed costs. However, 
its efﬁ ciency-based defense was rejected by the Supreme Court, based 
on the Antitrust Division’s position that such an arrangement should 
be sanctioned as price ﬁ xing. 
 A Political Shift Finding Its Theoretical Foundations 
 From a theoretical point of view, two converging movements ampli-
ﬁ ed this turn. The ﬁ rst was the hitherto unseen support from institu-
tionalist economists for the antitrust laws,  69  and the second was the 
shift made by former laissez-faire champions abandoning traditional 
English-style liberalism, to the neo-liberal model, accepting govern-
ment interventions aimed at preserving the competitive process.  70  
 The First Chicago School, whose ﬁ gureheads were Frank Knight, 
Jacob Viner, and Henry Simons, considered that the concentration 
of economic power needed also to be restrained to ensure both its 
dispersion and political decentralization.  71  Indeed, the institutional 
economists’ perspective on government intervention and antitrust 
enforcement, paradoxically was more or less accepted by the First 
Chicago School in the late 1930s. Despite its reafﬁ rmed liberalism, 
to which Knight’s criticism of the institutional economists’ concept 
of social control testiﬁ es,  72  Chicago scholars accepted a stronger 
enforcement of antitrust laws to correct market dynamics.  73  The First 
Chicago School took a position very close to those of the late U.S. 
institutional economists, advocating for formal rules at the expense of 
implementation of the  rule of reason .  74  They also supported the pre-
vention and—at the extreme—the prohibition of acquisition of sub-
stantial monopoly power “regardless of how reasonably that power 
may appear to be exercised.”  75  In brief, until the 1950s the First Chi-
cago School supported anti-monopoly policies to thwart the concen-
tration of economic power and to “ensure that no single corporation 
 69.  Mayhew, “Love the Sherman Antitrust Act,” 179–201.
 70.  Mirovski and Plehwe,  The Road from Mont Pèlerin .
 71.  Van Horn, “Chicago’s Shifting Attitude,” 1527–1544.
 72.  Knight, “The Newer Economics,” 433–476.
 73.  Simons,  A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire .
 74.  On the views of neoliberal movements of the late 1930s on antitrust, and
their possible (limited) convergence with the old institutional economics tradi-
tion in the United States, see Mirowski and Plehwe,  The Road from Mont Pèlerin , 
describing the debates initiated by Walter Lippmann’s contribution (Lippman,  An 
Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society ). 
 75.  Simons,  Economic Policy for a Free Society , 58.
dominates an industry.”  76  Recognizing the legitimacy of positive state 
action to preserve the market process against the deleterious effects 
of the concentration of economic power was one of the basic features 
of its neoliberalism, and in line with the view of classical economists 
such as Adam Smith.  77  
 Antitrust legitimacy rapidly evolved toward a more structuralist 
approach that assimilated the issue of economic power within market 
concentration. That was the Harvard School’s vision that emphasized 
the relationship between market power, business conduct, and mar-
ket outcomes (the Structure-Conduct-Performance [SCP] paradigm). 
This school of thought emerged in the late 1930s when Harvard econ-
omists such as Edward Mason, Joe Bain, Carl Kaysen, and Donald 
Turner conducted empirical surveys into speciﬁ c industries.  78  U.S. 
antitrust enforcement adopted such a structuralist dimension  79  “to 
preserve a diverse and pluralistic society hospitable to small busi-
ness and the entrepreneur.”  80  The deﬁ nition of competition con-
verged toward an effective situation of rivalry among ﬁ rms.  81  The 
living proﬁ t theory used by Judge Learned Hand in his ruling in the 
1945  Alcoa case embodies this approach.  82  In this margin squeeze 
case,  83  the vertically integrated “dominant” operator was obliged to 
set its contractual conditions to avoid excluding competitors from 
the market (whatever their respective efﬁ ciencies) and allow them to 
make a reasonable proﬁ t.  84  This conception contrasted sharply with 
the then-current U.S. efﬁ ciency-centered approach.  85  
 76.  Van Horn, “Chicago’s Shifting Attitude,” 1532.
 77.  Viner, “The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire,” 45–69.
 78.  See, e.g., Kaysen and Turner,  Antitrust Policy or Bain, “Barriers to New
Competition.” 
 79.  Thurman’s view on the scope of antitrust laws differs sharply from the
conventional interpretation of the Sherman Act and deﬁ nitely contradicts Robert 
Bork’s (1966) interpretation: “The Antitrust laws should be revised so that the 
government could strike at market domination, regardless of how the power 
over prices had been acquired and regardless of motive or intent” (Thurman, 
 The Folklore of Capitalism ). 
 80.  Fox, “Antitrust as a Window,” 565.
 81.  “Through these years, the Supreme Court deﬁ ned ‘competition’ as a process
of interaction among numerous buyers and sellers, none too large. The process 
of competition would, it was thought, provide a fair and impersonal system of 
governance and prevent exploitation, coercion, and exclusion” (Fox, “Antitrust 
as a Window,” 554–588). Fox deﬁ ned consumer interests in terms of “access to a 
variety of prices, quality, and service options.” 
 82.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of America , 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
 83.  “A margin squeeze may occur when the dominant provider of an input is
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ers.” Jullien, et al., “The Economics of Margin Squeeze.” 
 84.  Sidak, “Abolishing the Price Squeeze,” 279–309.
 85.  Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims,” 967.
 The Second Chicago School’s Economization Defense 
 Economic theory provided signiﬁ cant support for a renewal of active 
antitrust enforcement. Whereas World War II had led to a more circum-
spect approach than that of Thurman Arnold, the Truman administra-
tion found an equilibrium between the oligopoly structure of leading 
industries and an antitrust enforcement policy aimed at conciliating 
these private economic powers and preserving their accountability 
to the wider public interest and the economic opportunities of their 
competitors. Big business was accepted, but was also restrained by 
antitrust laws. Second Chicago School promoters initially challenged 
this middle course antitrust theoretically in the early 1950s, but their 
inﬂ uence did not become signiﬁ cant until the Nixon presidency. 
 The Theoretical Construction of Pro-Trust Antitrust 
 The reversal of the Supreme Court’s decisional practice concerning 
antitrust law enforcement dates from the 1977  GTE Sylvania deci-
sion, and, as we will see, the late 1960s breakpoint in the Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division, from a theoretical point of view, might 
reach back to 1946. The replacement of Henry Simons by Aaron 
Director led the Chicago School to reconsider the “issue of monopoly.”  86 
Contestable market theory, according to which whatever the market 
concentration, the absence of barriers to entry is sufﬁ cient to pro-
duce a competitive environment,  87  was already subjacent. Beneﬁ ting 
from monopoly rents was seen as a key incentive to invest, which 
was the driving force of the competitive process. The market process 
was itself an equilibrating counterforce, as “competition, even if not 
visible, could undermine and destroy all forms of monopoly.”  88  In 
contrast to its predecessor, the Second Chicago School prescribed a 
case-by-case approach based on assessment of the effects of a consid-
ered practice in the market. Chicagoan scholars rejected all judgment 
criteria grounded on intent or “fair market practices.” 
 The Chicago School’s great transformation cannot be appreciated 
without some understanding of Friedrich von Hayek’s inﬂ uence and 
the support of the Volker Fund, initiated by  The Road to Serfdom 
(1944). The Volker Fund ﬁ nanced two successive programs within 
the University of Chicago, the Free Market Study (FMS) Project 
(1946–1952) and the Antitrust Project (1953–1957), both co-chaired 
by Aaron Director and Edward Levi. The FMS’s startup did not mark 
 86.  Van Horn, “Chicago’s Shifting Attitude,” 1539.
 87.  Baumol, et al.,  Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure .
 88.  Rutherford, “Walton Hamilton, Antitrust, and Chicago,” 1403.
any rupture with the First Chicago School’s views. There is evidence 
of consensual positions expressed at the Mont Pèlerin Society’s 
(MPS’s) ﬁ rst meeting in 1947.  89  The lecture delivered by Aaron Direc-
tor was in line with Simons’s arguments.  90  However, the reversal 
was imminent. The FMS program promoters focused on the issue of 
concentration of economic power (for example, in terms of assessing 
successes and failures of the antitrust laws, and reconsidering patent 
law). The rupture that followed Robert Van Horn’s pronouncements, 
relied on the discovery that monopoly is not “the great enemy of 
democracy.”  91  In other words, a dominant—if not a monopolistic—
position had no deleterious effects on the market process, as such a 
position was intrinsically precarious. The concentration of a given 
market was considered the inexorable result of economies of scale 
and scope. At the same time, barriers to entry were mainly artiﬁ cial 
and stemmed from government interventions deriving from capture 
phenomena. Additionally, any exclusionary practices implemented 
by dominant undertakings were represented merely as short-term dis-
crimination strategies. 
 The breaking point can be pinned down to the last two years of 
the FMS program. As Van Horn stresses,  92  the ﬁ rst tremor was a book 
review by Aaron Director published in the  University of Chicago Law 
Review in 1950. Director admitted that competition forces remained 
subjacent even if a single ﬁ rm dominated the market, maintaining 
the incentive structure and leading to an optimal outcome. In the 
Antitrust Project, numerous studies were carried out on exclusionary 
practices, predatory pricing, resale price maintenance, tying arrange-
ments, price discrimination, and vertical integration. These works 
concluded that many of these market strategies were benign and 
should not be restricted through per se rules (limiting judges’ discre-
tion, as Simons recommended) but should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, according to the rule of reason. 
 This theoretical shift is embodied in a manifesto published by 
Director and Levi in the  Northwestern Law Review , titled “Law and 
the Future: Trade Regulation” (1956). The authors’ avowed purpose 
was to defend the principles of competition and free enterprise against 
 89.  The Mont Pèlerin Society constitutes one of the most important interna-
tional groups of free-market intellectuals. In April 1947, Austrian economist 
Friedrich von Hayek organized the ﬁ rst meeting of the Society at the Hotel Park 
at Mont Pèlerin, near Vevey, Switzerland, including thirty-six participants, such 
as Milton Friedman, his brother-in-law Aaron Director, Frank Knight, and George 
Stigler representing the emerging Chicago School. 
 90.  Van Horn, “The Roots of Chicago Law and Economics,” 209.
 91.  Ibid., 204.
 92.  Ibid., 217.
future NIRA-type public policies. However, unlike what Simons had 
advocated, such a goal did not lead to condemning unilateral abuse 
of market power, if not market power itself. Director and Levi were 
not advocating for stricter enforcement of antitrust rules; rather, they 
felt the opposite. They wanted to reinstate the legitimacy of the indi-
vidual dominant position. The article represented a real rupture with 
the First Chicago School. One of the main reversals was undoubt-
edly defense of the rule of reason over per se rules. Director and Levi 
pointed to the friction between two opposing tendencies in the Com-
mon Law. Because antitrust enforcement is based on Common Law 
principles, its implementation should be characterized by ﬂ exibility 
and ambiguity, or by certainty and automaticity. However, the 1950s 
antitrust rulings belonged to the second tendency. Certain practices 
were seen as themselves anticompetitive (for instance, resale price 
maintenance introduced by the 1911 Supreme Court decision in 
 Dr. Miles ).  93  Therefore, they might be sanctioned without consider-
ation of any actual or potential effects. The Second Chicago School 
rejected the view that economic theory leads to consideration  ex ante 
of a given market practice as anticompetitive. It is necessary always 
to consider the speciﬁ c circumstances of the case, and to ground the 
decision in accurate and up-to-date economic theory. According to 
Director and Levi, even economic theory might structure the judge’s 
decision. Still, “The law indeed can have a life on its own. But in this 
ﬁ eld of law more than any other, the general presumptions are of such 
a character that they cannot be readily isolated from the correspond-
ing presumptions which dominate economic theory.”  94  
 It would be surprising to see now-dominant Chicago School 
scholars rejecting the conclusions of industrial organization models 
advocating safe harbors to beneﬁ t dominant ﬁ rms.  95  Contrary to this 
1950s positioning, the Chicago School now prefers the certainty and 
automatic tendencies of the implementation of Common Law prin-
ciples over what Director and Levi called the “changing fashion of 
economic theory.” However, the relative positions have changed; the 
Second Chicago School prescriptions have been challenged for thirty 
years, and yesterday’s supporters of per se rules are now denounced 
as defenders of a mechanical implementation of fossilized economic 
theory and normative views through the Common Law nature of U.S. 
antitrust enforcement, creating a “neo-classical legal thought” and 
reinvigorating a laissez-faire competition policy. 
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 95.  Crane, “Antitrust Modesty,” 1193.
 In our conclusion, we consider this illogical switch, whereby the 
advocacy for economization is theoretically founded on a paradigm 
that recommends a per se approach concerning unilateral practices. 
We analyze the 1956 Director and Levi article to highlight the extent 
to which the roots of the Second Chicago School Antitrust enforce-
ment approach can be traced to this manifesto, embodying the 
conclusions of the FMS and the Antitrust Projects. Support for a pro-
gressive reduction in the scope of antitrust law enforcement with the 
exception of industry combinations, was conﬁ rmed by the 2008 U.S. 
Department of Justice report on single-ﬁ rm practices, which echoes 
several arguments in this paper. The relevance of the notion of exclu-
sionary abuse is debated, and the application of antitrust to dominant 
ﬁ rms is called into question. 
 Following Director and Levi (1956), such a shift implies that 
sanctioning monopolistic behavior cannot always be legitimate; the 
judge must consider the process through which such a position was 
achieved. According to the Chicago School, the monopoly position, 
in itself, need not be assimilated as the fruit of a monopolization strat-
egy. The Supreme Court stated in  Grinnel  96  that a monopoly position 
acquisition based on merit need not be sanctioned. The enforcement 
of antitrust laws must take account of the need to provide safe harbors 
for ﬁ rms whose “growth or development [is] a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”  97  
 Thus, Director and Levi’s theoretical views  98  dispute the princi-
ple underlying Judge Hand’s ruling in the  Alcoa case. Judge Hand’s 
decision personiﬁ es the “populist” era of U.S. antitrust enforcement, 
characterized by strong mistrust vis-à-vis undertakings enjoying a 
dominant position. According to the Chicago scholars, sanctioning 
dominant ﬁ rms leads to consumers being deprived of the gains from 
economies of scale and scope. Preferring a system of multiple produc-
ers could lead antitrust enforcers to privilege maintenance of the orga-
nization of industry in small units “in spite of possible cost[s]” ( Alcoa , 
at 429). Director and Levi denounced the difﬁ culty encountered by the 
accused ﬁ rm to develop an efﬁ ciency defense in such antitrust cases. 
They also asserted that the  Alcoa decision shifted the burden of proof 
to the defendant regarding compliance in its practices with antitrust 
law provisions. Some of the major features of modern U.S. antitrust 
legislation may have been germinated by their challenge to  Alcoa . 
 One of the main dimensions of Director and Levi’s 1956 manifesto 
is undoubtedly their analysis of the treatment of exclusionary abuses, 
 96.  U.S. v. Grinnel Corp ., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
 97.  Ibid.
 98.  Director and Levi, “Trade Regulation,” 296.
and especially their advocacy for the economization of antitrust laws. 
First, the existence of leverage strategies that allow a dominant enter-
prise to extend its monopoly power from one market to another is 
under a cloud of suspicion. Second, they reproach the 1950s U.S. 
antitrust enforcers for their mechanistic views of what can be deﬁ ned 
as monopolization under the Sherman Act. They consider also that 
subsequent laws—such as the FTC, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman 
acts—“have introduced a certain automaticity into the law; to some 
extent they preclude or make unnecessary separate inquiry in each 
of the cases as to effects, advantages, or disadvantages of the banned 
practices.” (p. 289). In contrast, they promote an enforcement model 
based on both an analysis of “signiﬁ cant market data” and on the 
“incorporation of advances in economic teaching into the case law” 
(p. 290). 
 Thus, research launched within the FMS and Antitrust Project 
program frameworks and based on their directors’ synthesis paper led 
to the foundation of the present-day U.S. antitrust theoretical frame-
work and its enforcement practices. The withdrawn 2008 report by 
the Antitrust Division regarding single-ﬁ rm conduct embodies this 
approach. It requires agencies to assess all market practices with 
regard to their impact on economic efﬁ ciency, and, more precisely, on 
consumer welfare. At the same time, to avoid false positive decisions 
(that is, to wrongly sanction a ﬁ rm), the burden of proof is on the 
complainant and not the respondent, and its standard must be raised 
signiﬁ cantly. The Chicagoans consider that these decisions are more 
harmful than false negatives, as soon as the market process is unable 
to correct their effects.  99  
 Almost all of the Supreme Court’s antitrust decisions since 1977 
can be read according to these rules. The economization of antitrust 
enforcement is nonexclusively but predominantly rooted in Second 
Chicago School prescriptions. As Rutherford emphasizes,  100  such a 
shift toward a more economic approach to antitrust can be explained 
as soon as the primary concern of antitrust law is no longer interpreted 
as prevention of the abuse of coercive powers in market relationships, 
and as only the maximization of consumer welfare.  101  Discrimination 
among contractors, and rent extraction through monopoly prices, can 
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and consumer welfare might be 
enhanced. Per se rules restricting market practices or competitors’ 
market access protection might impair the welfare maximization 
(reinterpreted) purpose of antitrust laws. 
 99.  Easterbrook, “The Limits of Antitrust,” 2–40.
 100.  Rutherford, “Walton Hamilton, Antitrust, and Chicago,” 1385–1407. 
 101.  Bork, “Legislative Intent,” 7–48. 
 The hallmark of the antitrust Chicago School, in its second version, is 
to promote allocative efﬁ ciency—consumer welfare maximization—
as the only, original, and legitimate goal of antitrust law. This leads 
to strong suspicion of the other antitrust statutes on the grounds that 
they favor a per se approach and are designed primarily to protect 
the interests of speciﬁ c economic operators—chieﬂ y small and medi-
um-sized ﬁ rms—at the expense of ﬁ nal consumers.  102  The Chicago 
School refuses to balance consumer welfare with other public policy 
objectives, relying only on a very simple and apparently clear-cut 
criterion—allocative efﬁ ciency. Therefore, unlike post-Chicago mod-
els that have won the race in the academic market but not in the 
judicial ﬁ eld, this approach offers feasible decision rules. In addition, 
it represents itself as a nonpartisan device. By adopting economic 
reasoning, the decision might be seen as nonpolitical; by refusing 
to consider any public policy argument outside consumer welfare 
maximization, it allows the depoliticization of judicial decisions. No 
social preferences or contemporary perceived necessities have to be 
taken into account. Economic expertise—outside the legal profession—
guarantees the objectivity of the decision. 
 However, this apparent neutrality requires some discussion. 
First, maximizing wealth does not imply that the result of the con-
sidered practices is Pareto-improving.  103  A Kaldor-Hicks criterion is 
subjacent.  104  The identity of the gainers and of the losers is outside 
the scope of antitrust law. The hypothetical compensations must 
be implemented (or not) by government. This question is not rel-
evant to antitrust law enforcement. Second, the apparently more 
economic approach to antitrust is adherence to a given economic 
theory—favorable to dominant ﬁ rms—rather than a ﬁ rst junction 
between competition law and competition economics. This point 
is particularly important because the Chicago School prescriptions 
have evolved toward per se rules. 
 Indeed, in the 1980s, the Chicago School approach led to para-
doxical per se rules that directed the courts to consider, without any 
effective assessment, that some market practices were consubstan-
tially pro-competitive. This applied, for example, to exclusive dealing 
arrangements.  105  The industrial organization literature has rehabil-
itated the case-based evaluation. A given practice may have a net 
 102.  Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy after Chicago,” 213–284. 
 103.  The Pareto criterion considers that a change in the allocation of resources is 
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positive or negative effect on consumer welfare with regard to the 
time-and-place-speciﬁ c market conditions. However, the inﬂ uence 
of the Chicago School continues to dominate, as testiﬁ ed to by the 
fourteen consecutive pro-defendant U.S. court decisions  106  and 
the rallying of the new Harvard School to adopt more moderate 
practice.  107 
 To some extent, the Second Chicago School renews classical legal 
thought by paradoxically advocating for per se rules to provide com-
peting ﬁ rms with antitrust safe harbors. Its prescriptions have become 
surprisingly convergent with those of the late nineteenth century’s 
legal scholars who advocated for a laissez-faire policy. 
 How Have Neoliberal Views on Antitrust Become Collective? 
 The Second Chicago School manifesto was published in 1956; this 
pro-trust antitrust approach became dominant twenty years later 
(although many scholars contest the fact that the Supreme Court 
ever really espoused it). We want to suggest how this approach—
initially marginal in terms of both political and theoretical inﬂ u-
ence—prevailed over Truman’s middle-course strategy. To this end, 
we discuss the increasing debate around antitrust policy from the 
1950s to the 1973 economic crisis, and then highlight how Chica-
goan theory managed to shape a consensus on antitrust issues based 
on use of the rule of reason, aimed at focusing its enforcement only 
on efﬁ ciency consideration and the speed with which it evolved 
toward per se rules. 
 An Increasingly Challenged Policy 
 In 1952, Charles Sawyer, Commerce Secretary of the Truman adminis-
tration, released a report on “effective competition.” Freyer underlines 
that it was the department’s Business Advisory Council, composed 
mainly of corporate executives, that prepared the report.  108  Although 
the antitrust enforcement policy was not criticized directly, the report 
insisted that it was necessary to reshape the deﬁ nition of competition 
to take account of the transformation of the U.S. economy, which had 
led to higher levels of economic concentration. The report presents 
antitrust law enforcement as inducing risks and costs for large ﬁ rms. 
Thus, it recommends the publication of guidelines and a broader 
use of the rule of reason to reduce the scope of per se prohibitions. 
 106.  Elhauge, “Harvard, Not Chicago,” 59–77. 
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Alongside the Chicagoan critique in classrooms, antitrust policy was 
also challenged in public debate throughout the next twenty years. 
Antitrust laws were denigrated as anti-business, as depriving ﬁ rms 
of the beneﬁ ts of economies of scale, and constraining them to privi-
lege conglomerate strategies and hindering their growth and compet-
itiveness at the expense of U.S. consumers. Denunciation of the dark 
side of antitrust enforcement increased, whatever the commentators’ 
respective tendencies, from Peter Drucker in 1946,  109  to Richard 
Hofstadter in 1964,  110  who described antitrust as mainly an ideology, 
and ﬁ nally to Alan Greenspan, who, in 1967,  111  considered that the 
capital market alone can and ought to regulate competition without 
any activist intervention. 
 The middle-course antitrust policy relies on several social val-
ues and not on the single criterion of efﬁ ciency. As a consequence, 
the liberal inspired antitrust enforcement policy and its underly-
ing theories, such as the workable competition approach,  112  could 
be criticized because they lead to a balance between conﬂ icting 
and incommensurate values, such as consumer welfare and broader 
social beneﬁ ts, such as the distribution or protection of small busi-
nesses. The accent on fairness, reﬂ ecting the notion of reasonableness 
of the tenants of institutional economics, was criticized bitterly as 
lacking any objective basis. It risked exposing ﬁ rms to legal uncer-
tainty and leaving excessive room for judges’ discretional decisions. 
According to Bork,  113  such pluralistic enforcement objectives rely on 
“a jumble of half-digested notions and mythologies” and deprive the 
enforcers of both objective decision rules and a unique criterion—
consumer welfare. 
 This situation led to controversial decisions that have been 
denounced as emblematic of overenforcement of antitrust laws. This 
applies, for instance, to the case of the  Brown Shoe U.S. Supreme 
Court decision.  114  The Court ruled against a merger (on the basis 
of the Celler-Kefauver amendment of 1950) because of its potential 
vertical and horizontal effects even though the project involved 
the fourth and the twelfth ﬁ rms in the sector, whose cumulative 
share of the retail market was less than 8 percent. In the 1970s, the 
market-centered discourse began to shape public perceptions and 
policy prescriptions, and to supplant the liberal antitrust policies. 
The increasing difﬁ culties involved in enforcing antitrust laws, 
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and the rise in private lawsuits during the 1960s, introduced addi-
tional risks for large U.S. ﬁ rms. These ﬁ rms denounced the unfair 
competition from Japanese and European ﬁ rms in a context in which 
antitrust seemed to be the enemy from within, hindering their com-
petitiveness and depriving them of the fruits of efﬁ ciency gains. 
 In a nutshell, the trauma of the post-1973 stagﬂ ation led to an effect 
similar to the 1937 Great Depression relapse in terms of antitrust 
enforcement. As Freyer states, “the dislocation of the business cycle 
in the 1970s was too disruptive, however, for the reliance upon lib-
eral regulatory policy making to persist unchallenged.”  115  The 1977 
U.S. Supreme Court  GTE Sylvania ruling signaled a turning point by 
implementing, according to Chicagoan recommendations, a rule of 
reason analysis for a vertical restriction cases. Considering efﬁ ciency 
gains led to deviation from the old case law based on per se prohibi-
tions. The Chicagoan period of the Antitrust Division undoubtedly 
began with the appointment of William Baxter by President Reagan, 
and possibly peaked with the single ﬁ rm practice report of 2008. The 
ﬁ rst cracks in earlier practices began to appear at the end of the Nixon 
administration, and the reversal can be dated to the Carter admin-
istration and congressional opposition toward more stringent anti-
merger regulations. 
 We might suggest also that the shift was the result of long-run move-
ments in the federal administration. For instance, Oliver Williamson 
dates the initial entry of antitrust economization to 1965–1968, when 
Donald F. Turner was Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice.  116  At the time, the dominant 
theoretical framework of the Antitrust Division was the structuralist 
school, which emphasized barriers to entry.  117  It encouraged monop-
oly explanations for all nonstandard or unfamiliar market practices, 
justifying strong antitrust remedies that were seen as the basis of a 
“populist era” of U.S. antitrust. However, the limitations of the struc-
ture-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm led to overenforcement of 
antitrust laws and a multiplication of the decisions that customarily 
we name, following Easterbrook,  118   false positives .  119  
 115.  Freyer, Antitrust, 139. 
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we are very ignorant, the number of un-understandable practices tends to be very 
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Organization,” 59–67). 
 From an institutional viewpoint, Williamson shows that the arrival 
of Donald Turner, the ﬁ rst economist with a PhD to head the Antitrust 
Division, led to a major breakdown in its policy, despite hisbeing one 
of the most inﬂ uential economists in the Harvard antitrust school. In 
his textbook on antitrust (co-written with Carl Kaysen and published 
in 1959), Turner asserted that the “limitation of market power, rather 
than consumer beneﬁ ts, [has] to be the chief purpose of Antitrust.”  120  
Nevertheless, he initiated the movement toward a more-economics 
approach that characterized U.S. antitrust law enforcement from the 
1980s. First, he re-equilibrated the inﬂ uence between lawyers and 
economists within the Antitrust Division. Its purpose was no longer 
to win cases but to target practices that harmed consumers. With an 
outstanding staff that included the current Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Breyer, as well as Richard Posner, Oliver Williamson, William 
Comanor, and Kenneth Elzinga, Turner gave antitrust enforcement 
sounder economic foundations.  121  
 Whatever the timing, the diffusion of the Chicago models affected 
the enforcement agencies before the Supreme Court. Williamson  122  
particularly highlights the case of efﬁ ciency gains resulting from 
mergers. The legislative framework at the time was very restrictive 
(consider the Celler-Kefauver amendment to the Clayton Act), yet 
its logic was completely reversed by the 1984 guidelines. From that 
time on, mergers have been considered efﬁ ciency enhancers, bene-
ﬁ ting the competitiveness of ﬁ rms and consumers who enjoy lower 
prices. The U.S. antitrust authorities can challenge a project only if it 
presents a signiﬁ cant danger to competition, and the judicial decision 
must balance this risk with the induced efﬁ ciency gains. The more-
economic approach implies assessing efﬁ ciency gains on a case-by-case 
basis and balancing them with potential damage to competition. It also 
induces a reversal of the presumptions compared to the interpretations 
of the Sherman Act made by Judge Hand in 1945. The more-economic 
approach not only involves use of economic criteria in the judicial 
decision, but it also represents a reversal of views about the legitimacy 
and long-term effects of market power. 
 The subordinate position of economics in antitrust law enforce-
ment, readily noticeable  123  in the 1970s, no longer exists in U.S. 
practice. The Chicago program advocates the implementation of an 
economic-oriented reasoning in the whole of legal practice, and antitrust 
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enforcement has progressively become an archetypical illustration of 
such an economization. In this sense, the Chicago School recommen-
dations are applied to antitrust law enforcement: economics must be 
used by the judge as the most relevant tool for deciding each case. 
 Conclusion 
 Despite the criticisms of the relevance of the Chicago School’s recom-
mendations, the inﬂ uence of economics on antitrust enforcement is 
no longer questioned—the economization process is recognized more 
than ever. Lawrence White highlights three main reasons for this.  124  
The ﬁ rst is due to the real advances, both theoretical and empirical 
developments (namely, the post-Chicago School). The second is that 
some economists have been involved in antitrust cases, either within 
the competition authority (such as its own chief economist and exter-
nal experts) or within companies that were plaintiffs or defendants 
in antitrust cases. Third, economists have been writing about speciﬁ c 
antitrust cases, including those in which they have participated.  125  
 One of the risks induced by exclusive reliance on general eco-
nomic models and derived per se rules can be assessed by consid-
ering the risks encountered in U.S. common law in the nineteenth 
century, such as classical legal thought.  126  Should economics take 
over judges’ rulings? Consequently, current debate on the conser-
vative bias of U.S. antitrust could be reconsidered in the light of 
Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion in  Lochner : “General proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on 
a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.” 
The neutrality induced by economic models may be an illusion.  127 
A judicial decision cannot be limited to a mechanical and neutral 
process. We must reject the hypothesis that the economization process 
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itself is apolitical.  128  As Eleanor Fox stated, economics cannot be 
seen as value-free.  129 
 The belief that economic theory debates have shaped judges’ 
decisions might be purely conceit. If one reads Holmes attentively, 
one might wonder whether economics is not ﬁ nally the unquestion-
able way to rationalize a given decision, to dress it in the “clothes 
of the Science”—that is, to implement the famous sentence, “We 
decide, and then we deduce.” Donald Dewey’s striking 1964 article 
quotes Chicago economists in a footnote illustrating the existence 
of debates on predation in modern economics. The views expressed 
are the same:
 I have become increasingly skeptical of the economics arguments 
that the courts invoke to justify their rulings […]. It is superﬂ uous 
to the extent that judges are merely playing the antitrust game by 
offering economic arguments to justify decisions taken on other 
grounds. To criticize the courts for having the wrong antitrust goals 
is politics, not science.  130  
 As Herbert Hovenkamp underlined in 1985, the paradigm shift 
toward an economic approach to antitrust since  GTE Sylvania does 
not imply that antitrust practitioners started using economic-based or 
economic theory grounded rules of decision in the late 1970s.  131  The 
former antitrust paradigm (the Warren Era) cannot be described as 
isolated economic thinking. The inﬂ uence of academics was effective 
from the Second New Deal period forward. Therefore, the rise of the 
Chicago School inﬂ uence does not mark a late conﬂ uence between 
antitrust and economics, but rather can be interpreted as a shift 
between competing economic models. Indeed, the core implication 
of the Chicagoan moment is not the emergence of economic-centered 
thinking, and especially efﬁ ciency concerns, but the fact that lawyers 
are invited to ground their decisions  only in economics, and that efﬁ -
ciency must be the only legitimate criterion for antitrust laws. 
 Such a paradigm shift cannot be explained only by academic debate. 
Two fundamental movements made this evolution possible. The ﬁ rst is 
the 1970s economic crisis and the increasing lack of conﬁ dence in the 
“liberal regulatory State.”  132  On the one hand, the greater the difﬁ cul-
ties encountered by ﬁ rms, the stronger the pressure to relax competition 
laws and other regulation. On the other hand, the evolution we have 
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described in antitrust is just one facet of a more general movement in 
public policy: the deregulation wave. In a nutshell, the middle-course 
antitrust policy resulted in an equilibrium between a ﬁ rst tendency that 
emphasizes democratic participation and social justice, and a second 
tendency centered primarily on economic efﬁ ciency to improve liv-
ing standards and foster economic growth.  133  If, before the 1980s, 
antitrust enforcers tried to reconcile these two aspects, “the Antitrust 
Chicago School revolution discarded talk of social and political goals 
and reframed antitrust to focus solely on economic concerns.”  134 
 The origin of the second fundamental movement is rooted not 
in the economic situation or in political values, but inside the legal 
system. As seen earlier, the Warren Court had to manage a multival-
ued antitrust tradition that served several objectives whose nature 
might be economic, social, or political. As Sullivan underlined,  135  
antitrust enforcers should be cautious not only about efﬁ ciency but 
also market access, dealer independence, and good faith in trans-
actions, and should correct excessive asymmetries in bargaining 
powers. In other words, they need to balance efﬁ ciency, equity, 
and fairness. Decision rules are difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd and to implement 
in such situations. On the one hand, the inﬂ uence of the legal real-
ists deters judges from grounding their decisions only within the 
legal sphere.  136  On the other hand, the Structuralist School of Eco-
nomics (e.g., Harvard) provides more insights into the dynamics 
of the industrial branches than operational guidelines, allowing 
assessment of a speciﬁ c ﬁ rm strategy. 
 The Second Chicago School, and especially its afﬁ liated law pro-
fessors and judges, such as Bork, Easterbrook, and Posner,  137  suc-
ceeded because the school had proposed objectives and manageable 
tools that provided solutions to both the social request for efﬁ ciency 
and the judicial need for decision rules. The school provides—for 
both judges and policy makers—a coherent system in a tractable 
language. However, the Chicago School moment led to use of “sim-
plistic, short run, static theory to solve complex, long run, strate-
gic problems.”  138  Progress in economic analysis tended to reject 
Chicago School views (noted already in 1985 by Hovenkamp).  139 
Post-Chicago models based on game theory led to more complex 
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and more ambiguous results. Nevertheless, the Chicago message is 
still particularly inﬂ uential despite these theoretical challenges. Its 
resilience lies in the same reasoning that underlies its success: its 
simplicity—its capacity to provide clear-cut conclusions about what 
is efﬁ cient and what is inefﬁ cient. 
 Underlining this characteristic might seem ironic. The Chicago 
School revolution began with very detailed and comprehensive case 
studies.  140  The school, in its origins, bitterly criticized per se rules, 
and its moment was conﬁ rmed by the  GTE Sylvania decision, which 
overturned long-standing case law that prohibited per se vertical 
restraints and allowed a rule-of-reason approach.  141  However, the 
 tour de force of this school was its success in simplifying and opera-
tionalizing its recommendations in very few prescriptions and con-
clusions, allowing judges and practitioners to ground their decisions 
on some very simple models and to rely on per se rules, not in terms 
of prohibitions but of acceptance. For example, consider the strik-
ing evolution of Posner’s position on per se rules regarding vertical 
restraints just a few years after the  GTE Sylvania ruling.  142  
 The promotion of per se rules can perhaps be explained by the 
general distrust of government regulation, and, by extension, of judi-
cial decisions. Chicagoan scholars increasingly highlight the risks 
of ungrounded decisions and advocate for the limitations of judi-
cial discretion.  143  Milton Friedman’s position embodies this shift 
toward revival of the laissez-faire approach, which is signiﬁ cantly 
different from the economic-based rule of reason ﬁ rst promoted:
 My own views about the antitrust laws have changed greatly over 
time. When I started in this business, as a believer in competition, 
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I was a great supporter of antitrust laws. … But as I watched what 
actually happened, I saw that, instead of promoting competition, 
antitrust laws tended to do exactly the opposite, because they 
tended, like so many government activities, to be taken over by the 
people they were supposed to regulate and control. And so over 
time I have gradually come to the conclusion that antitrust laws do 
far more harm than good and that we would be better off if didn’t 
have them at all.  144  
 Two ﬁ nal questions might be raised by this antitrust modesty, 
grounded in an apparently old-fashioned economic theory. The ﬁ rst 
deals with the reasons why its charms have not dissipated; the sec-
ond is related to its consequences in terms of economic dynamics. 
The resilience of the Chicago School inﬂ uence may be explained at 
least in part by its capacity to provide clear rules of decision. Mean-
while, as Nicola Giocoli underlines, its competitors are dominant 
in the classroom but not ready for the courtrooms because of their 
inability to provide tractable results.  145  
 Is such a situation regrettable in economic terms? We might con-
sider that the persistence of this “old lady charm” has the merit that 
it privileges economic efﬁ ciency. According to Chicago scholars, the 
induced risk of antitrust law underenforcement is less harmful in 
the long run, as markets are self-correcting as soon as the barriers of 
entry settle at their natural level. Under the Chicago research pro-
gram, wealth transfers are considered as neutral. A market practice 
should be prosecuted only if it leads to a reduction in productive and 
allocative efﬁ ciency, whatever its distributional consequences.  146  
However, these efﬁ ciency gains might be questionable and compe-
tition policy cannot be considered as neutral in terms of distribu-
tion. The doubts that Dewey cast on the use of economic analysis in 
antitrust have not been completely allayed ﬁ fty years later. Indeed, 
the Chicago School’s rise has taken place at a time when inequality 
has never been greater in the United States.  147  Some arguments may 
plead for this linkage. 
 First, the main argument, developed earlier in this article, is about 
the goal of the Chicago School, privileging economic efﬁ ciency only. 
In other words, neither social preferences nor equality concerns 
are taken into account in the reasoning.  148  Economic analysis as a 
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scientiﬁ c tool must guarantee the legislator’s neutrality. Second, 
Chicago’s less interventionist approach has resulted partly in the 
emergence of market power ﬁ rms. The arrival of Frank Easterbrook, 
appointed by Ronald Reagan, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, was essential to curb competition policy. Any question 
of wealth distribution has been largely thrown out. Thus, the subse-
quent lack of competition may have caused growing economic and 
social inequalities in the long run. Although the empirical literature 
is rather scant on the subject, there are some studies that show wealth 
transfer from consumers to ﬁ rms with market power.  149  Lax compe-
tition policy has strengthened industry consolidation. In practice, a 
series of merger waves has transformed the competitive environment 
into one often controlled by a few big players (e.g., such as energy, air-
lines, pharmaceuticals, large retailers, and so on). Third, lack of com-
petition may also have increased inequality, by leading companies 
to drive down employees’ wages. For instance, as the Department of 
Justice revealed in 2010, top executives made secret agreements not 
to recruit one another’s employees in order to suppress wages, even 
as their proﬁ ts were rising.  150  Nonetheless, the empirical economic 
literature shows that merger waves have not negatively impacted the 
level of employment, at least in the United States. 
 Thus, the ongoing debate on the bestselling book by Thomas 
Piketty,  Capital in the 21st Century , echoes concerns about economic 
and social inequalities in the United States.  151  With regard to the rise 
of the Chicago School, economic reasoning, tax cuts, the decline of 
unions, and the importance of ﬁ nancial markets may not be the only 
determinants of the growing economic inequality. It may perhaps be 
“apolitical” policies based on the concept of “economic efﬁ ciency” 
that may explain part of the growing inequality. 
 Antitrust policy may be a relevant research ﬁ eld to analyze this 
great transformation of our economic system. The Chicagoan model 
has supplanted the former antitrust paradigm that could be con-
sidered a political compromise searching to conciliate efﬁ ciencies 
and the fairness of wealth distribution. Antitrust law enforcement 
must avoid chilling efﬁ ciency gains and loss of political and social 
support.  152  However, the Chicago School goes beyond the scope of 
 149.  See, for instance, Comanor and Smiley, “Monopoly and the Distribution of 
Wealth.” The authors ﬁ nd that “the presence of past and current monopoly has had 
a major impact on the degree of inequality in the current distribution of household 
wealth” (p. 189). 
 150.  “Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering 
into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements,” U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, September 24, 2010. 
 151.  Piketty,  Capital in the Twenty-First Century . 
 152.  Baker, “Economics and Politics,” 2186. 
economics with this kind of tradeoff by choosing to consider only the 
efﬁ ciency dimension. Promoting efﬁ ciency at the expense of control 
of wealth transfer is not only a distributional issue; it also affects the 
growth potential of the whole economy. 
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